Echenique and Yenmez [AER 2015, 105(8): 2679-94] study choice rules for a school that express preferences for a diverse student body. Their Theorem 2 characterizes choice rules that are "generated by reserves for the priority". We show that the "only if part" is not correct. We exhibit a choice rule that is generated by reserves for the priority but violates one of their axioms. A similar issue arises in Theorem D.2., where a priority is allowed to be endogenous. We reformulate the axioms and repair the results.
The Model and Notation
We first present the primitives of that are relevant for our discussion. Let S be a nonempty finite set of students. A choice rule C for a school maps each nonempty set S ⊆ S to a nonempty subset C(S) ⊆ S. Let q denote the capacity of the school. It is such that for each S ⊆ S, |C(S)| ≤ q.
The set of students is partitioned into d different types. Let T ≡ {t 1 , . . . , t d } be the set of types and τ : S → T be the type function. For each S ⊆ S and t ∈ T , let S t ≡ {s ∈ S : τ (s) = t}. We assume that for each t ∈ T , q < |S t |.
A priority is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on S. A choice rule is generated by reserves for priority if there is a vector (r t ) t∈T ∈ Z |S| + such that ||r|| ≤ q and for each S ⊆ S, C(S) is determined by the following two-stage procedure. In the first stage, for each type t, type-t students with the highest priority are chosen until r t type-t students are chosen or no type-t student is left. In the second stage, for the remaining seats, students with the highest priority are chosen until all seats are filled or no student is left.
Results
Theorem 2 in claims that a choice rule is generated by reserves for priority if and only if it satisfies the following three axioms.
Gross Substitutes: If a student is chosen from a set S, then the student is also chosen from any subset of S that contains her.
Acceptance: A student is rejected only when all seats are filled.
A type t is saturated in a set of students if there is a set of students, with the same number of type-t students, in which not all type-t students are chosen. Saturated -compatibility: If a student s whose type is saturated is chosen over another student s , then s must have higher priority than s .
The following example shows that the "only if part" of Theorem 2 in Echenique and
Yenmez (2015) is not correct. In particular, the example illustrates a choice rule that is generated by reserves for a priority but violates saturated -compatibility.
r t 1 = 0, r t 2 = 1, and be defined as 1 2 3 4. Let C be the choice rule that is generated by (r t 1 , r t 2 ) for . Note that C(S) = {3}. Since 4 / ∈ S, t 2 is saturated in S.
However, 1 / ∈ C(S) and 1 3, implying that C violates saturated -compatibility.
We show that replacing saturated -compatibility with the following two axioms repairs the result. The following axiom was introduced by .
Within-type -compatibility: If a student s is chosen over another student s of the same type, then s must have higher priority than s .
A type t is saturated* in a set of students S if there is a set of students S such that the number of type-t students in S is no more than the number of chosen type-t students in S and not all type-t students are chosen in S . Formally, a type t is saturated* in S if there is S such that |S t | ≤ |C(S) ∩ S t | and S t \ C(S ) = ∅.
Saturated* -compatibility: If a student s whose type is saturated* is chosen over another student s of a different type, then s has higher priority than s .
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Note that within-type -compatibility is not implied by saturated* -compatibility, although it is implied by saturated -compatibility. Next, we show that replacing saturated -compatibility with within-type -compatibility and saturated* -compatibility repairs Theorem 2 in . Their proof cannot be repaired by simply invoking saturated -compatibility and within-type -compatibility instead of saturated -compatibility. Therefore, we provide a self-contained new proof.
that s ∈ C(S), s ∈ S \ C(S), and s s. Let τ (s) ≡ t. By within-type -compatibility, τ (s ) = t. Then, S ∈ X t and |C(S) ∩ S t | ≥ r t + 1, which is in contradiction to the definition of r t .
Finally, let C be generated by reserves for priority . Acceptance and within-type -compatibility follow by definition. Gross substitutes is shown in . To see saturated* -compatibility, let S ⊆ S, s ∈ C(S), and s ∈ S \ C(S) be such that τ (s) = t and τ (s ) = t. Suppose that type-t is saturated* in S. Then, the number of chosen type-t students in S is more than r t . Therefore, there is at least one type-t student who is considered together with s in the second stage of the choice procedure and he is chosen over s , which implies that each chosen type-t student in S, in particular s, has priority over s .
In their online appendix, Echenique and Yenmez (2015) also consider the case where priorities are not exogenously given. Their Theorem D.2. asserts that a choice rule is generated by reserves for some priority if and only if it satisfies gross substitutes, acceptance, and the following axiom called saturated strong axiom of revealed preference.
Saturated strong axiom of revealed preference (S-SARP):
There are no sequences
, of students and sets of students, respectively, such that, for all k
The following example shows that the "only if part" of Theorem D.2. is not correct, in particular, the example illustrates a choice rule that is generated by reserves for some priority but violates S-SARP.
Example 2. Let S ≡ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, T ≡ {t 1 , t 2 }, τ (1) = τ (2) = τ (3) = t 1 , τ (4) = τ (5) = τ (6) = t 2 , q = 2, r t 1 = 0, r t 2 = 1, and be defined as 1 2 3 4 5 6. Let C be the choice rule that is generated by (r t 1 , r t 2 ) for . Let s 1 = 2, s 2 = 5, S 1 = {2, 3, 4, 5},
Independence of Axioms in Theorem 2*
Violating only gross substitutes: Consider the choice rule in Example 3. Let be such that 1 2 3 4. Clearly, C satisfies acceptance and within-type -compatibility.
Note that a violation of saturated* -compatibility is possible only if there exists a choice set S such that 3 or 4 is chosen over 1 or 2 and t 2 is saturated* in S. Now, since 3 or 4 is chosen over 1 or 2 only if |S ∩ {3, 4}| = 1, and since there is no choice set which includes exactly one type-t 2 student and at which the type-t 2 student is not chosen, t 2 cannot be saturated* in S. Thus, C satisfies saturated* -compatibility. Finally, C violates gross substitutes since 2 ∈ C(S) but 2 / ∈ C(S \ {4}).
Violating only acceptance: Consider the choice rule in Example 4. Let be such that 1 2 3. Clearly, C satisfies gross substitutes, within-type -compatibility, and saturated* -compatibility, but violates acceptance.
Violating only within-type -compatibility: Consider the choice rule in Example 5.
Let be such that 1 2 3 4. Clearly, C satisfies acceptance and gross substitutes.
Since all students are of the same type, C trivially satisfies saturated* -compatibility.
Finally, C violates within-type -compatibility since 4 is chosen over 3 in {2, 3, 4} although 3 4.
Violating only saturated* -compatibility: Consider the choice rule in Example 5 but suppose that each student has a different type. Let be such that 1 2 3 4.
Clearly, C satisfies acceptance, gross substitutes, and within-type -compatibility. Finally, C violates saturated* -compatibility since 4 is chosen over 3 in {2, 3, 4} although 3 4 and the type of 4 is saturated in {2, 3, 4}, since there is one student of 4's type in S and 4 / ∈ C(S).
Independence of Axioms in Theorem D.2*
Violating only gross substitutes: Consider the choice rule in Example 3. As we have already argued before, C satisfies acceptance and violates gross substitutes. We will show that C satisfies S*-SARP. Let R be the revealed preference relation where s R s if there is S ∈ S such that s ∈ C(S), s ∈ S \ C(S), and either s and s are of the same type or the type of s is saturated* in S. Clearly, 1 R 2 and 3 R 4, and there is no other s and s of the same type with s R s . In order R to have a cycle, there must be s ∈ {3, 4} and s ∈ {1, 2} such that s R s . However, s ∈ {3, 4} is chosen over s ∈ {1, 2} in a set S only when s is the only type-t 2 student in S, in which case t 2 cannot be saturated* in S since there is no choice set which includes exactly one type-t 2 student and at which the type-t 2 student is not chosen. Thus, R is acyclic. Hence, C satisfies S*-SARP.
Violating only acceptance: Consider the choice rule in Example 4. Clearly, C satisfies gross substitutes and S*-SARP, since 1 is the only student who is chosen over some other student in some choice set. However, C violates acceptance.
Violating only S*-SARP: Consider the choice rule in Example 5. Clearly, C satisfies acceptance and gross substitutes. Note that the sequences {3, 4} and {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}} constitute a violation of S*-SARP.
